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We examine the relationship between employee supervision and 
compensation by taking advantage of the structure of the hotel 
industry, in which many chains have both company managed and 
franchised properties. Given that supervision is less rigorous at 
company managed establishments, we estimate differences in 
wages and human resource practices not only across company 
managed and franchised hotels within chains, but also within 
individual hotels as they change organizational form. While we 
cannot rule out the use of efficiency wages, our results suggest that 
agency problems affect the timing of pay and employers’ 
propensity to use performance-based incentives. 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction  
Opportunities for employees to lie, cheat, steal, or slack off abound in most firms. When 
supervision is difficult or costly, employers may structure pay in ways that mitigate agency 
problems in the workplace. As Lazear (1981) theorized, tilting the earnings-tenure profile such 
that wages start below but eventually rise above workers’ alternative wages can help to elicit 
effort from imperfectly monitored employees. To the extent that the minimum wage or other 
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constraints might limit firms’ abilities to lower starting wages, though, it may be advantageous 
for firms to pay efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Bulow and Summers 1986). Unlike 
under a simple deferred compensation scheme, the present value of compensation exceeds that of 
the full-information case with efficiency wages. However, to the extent that they help to attract 
better workers and discourage opportunistic behavior, efficiency wages may be profit-
maximizing for firms that face monitoring problems.  
In this paper, we consider the interaction between supervision and compensation in the hotel 
industry. The nature of hospitality services in general and the structure of the lodging industry in 
particular make hotels an apt setting in which to examine how differences in supervision levels 
potentially affect both the level and timing of pay. Unlike in many other labor-intensive 
industries, the size and physical layout of hotels render technology a poor substitute for close 
human supervision. Moreover, many hotel chains have both company managed and franchised 
properties. Relative to managers in company managed hotels, who are salaried employees of a 
parent company, managers in franchised hotels are residual claimants on profits generated by 
their properties and therefore have a strong incentive to supervise employees closely. In turn, we 
would expect franchises to make less use of deferred compensation or efficiency wages to 
motivate workers. 
Exploiting similar variation in organizational form in another hospitality industry, Krueger 
(1991) examines the extent to which fast food establishments respond to agency problems with 
delayed compensation schemes or efficiency wages. Krueger shows that relative to restaurants 
owned and operated by franchisees, those that are owned and managed by parent companies, 
whose workers generally face lower levels of supervision, pay roughly the same starting wages 
but have steeper wage-tenure profiles. Krueger’s results are consistent with the idea that both 
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delayed compensation and efficiency wages are used to help resolve incentive problems in the 
presence of monitoring costs. 
We expand on prior work on the implications of agency problems in the workplace and 
contribute more broadly to the literature on compensation theory using rich, longitudinal data on 
limited service hotels, in which general managers are typically responsible for overseeing 
employees throughout their establishments. Our data, which break out various aspects of 
compensation for highly detailed occupations within each hotel between 2003 and 2009, allow us 
to address selection issues and control more effectively than past studies for both observable and 
unobservable brand and establishment characteristics that might otherwise bias estimates of the 
effects of franchising on wages and other personnel policies. We do so by estimating differences 
in compensation and human resource practices not only across company managed and franchised 
hotels within chains, but also within individual hotels as they transition between company 
managed and franchised status.  
Our results suggest that differences in organizational form affect both the structure of 
compensation and the use of performance-based incentives in hotels. Specifically, company 
managed hotels are more likely than franchises to advertise a starting wage above the legislated 
minimum for nonsupervisory workers. Compared to starting wages, incumbent wages are also 
higher at company managed properties, indicative of their relatively steep earnings-tenure 
profiles. Moreover, though company managed hotels typically advertise higher starting pay, they 
are more likely than franchises to use probationary wages, which effectively tilt the wage-tenure 
profile and may help to induce sorting among applicants as well as elicit greater employee effort. 
Finally, franchisees, who may find it easier to evaluate the performance of individual workers 
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given the greater resources they devote to supervision, are more likely to offer bonuses to 
employees and to award raises based on merit rather than on tenure or other considerations.  
Overall, our results suggest that hotels use delayed compensation to cope with imperfect 
monitoring and allay agency problems. Our findings are not inconsistent with the use of 
efficiency wages, but at the same time, we cannot rule out the possibility that the present values 
of lifetime wages in hotel industry jobs with different implied levels of supervision are the same. 
Nonetheless, our results clearly show that variation in supervision levels between hotels with 
different organizational forms affects the timing of pay and employers’ propensity to use certain 
performance-based incentives.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the hotel 
industry’s structure and human resource practices. Section III reviews the theory and empirical 
literature on agency and compensation. In Section IV, we describe our data and provide 
descriptive statistics. We explain our empirical methodology and present our results on the 
relationship between organizational form and compensation in Section V. Section VI concludes. 
 
II.   Background on the Hotel Industry 
A.   Ownership and Management Structure in the Hotel Industry 
The hotel sector has gradually evolved from an industry made up largely of small independent 
owners to one dominated by several major chains. Overall chain affiliation rose from 35% in 
1970 to over 80% just 30 years later (Rushmore and Baum 2001). According to the Economic 
Census, the top four traveler accommodation companies commanded 17.5% of overall sales in 
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the industry in 2002, up from 16.3% just five years earlier.1 Branded hotels are ubiquitous, and 
individual hotels within chains are often indistinguishable from a customer perspective. 
However, even two observationally equivalent hotels carrying the same flag may have very 
different organizational forms. Any given hotel bearing a brand name could be under a franchise 
agreement, under a management contract, or company owned and operated.2 
Under a franchise agreement, the parent company of a hotel brand (the franchisor) grants an 
owner or developer (the franchisee) the right to use its brand name. In this case, the franchisor 
itself does not offer management services, but rather leaves day-to-day management, including 
decisions about staffing and pay, to the franchisee.3 The franchisee, in turn, is the residual 
claimant to the profits from the hotel’s operations (net of franchise fees and royalty payments). 
The benefits of brand affiliation for a franchisee include customer name recognition, assistance 
from the parent company in developing management policies and procedures as well as training 
programs, and supplier discounts. Also, though a franchisee pays substantial fees to use the 
brand name and receive these services,4 he or she also enjoys the benefits of chain advertising as 
                                                 
1 Economic Census data for the accommodation industry for 2002 can be found at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0272i01.pdf. Data for 1997 can be found at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/97r72-sm.pdf.  
2 We exclude hotels with no brand affiliation from this analysis because there are relatively few in our data and 
the information we have on each is more limited. Also, while the theory outlined in this paper would suggest that 
non-branded hotels might resemble franchises more so than company managed hotels in terms of their employee 
supervision levels and human resource practices, non-branded hotels undoubtedly differ in many unobservable ways 
that we may not be able to account for completely. 
3 Franchisees typically have nearly complete control over staffing levels, compensation, and other personnel 
matters. Hyatt Place’s franchise contract, for instance, states that, “Although we [the franchisor] retain the right to 
establish and periodically to modify System Standards for the Hotel that you agree to implement and maintain, and 
to modify the Hotel System as we deem best for Hyatt Place Hotels, you [the franchisee] retain the right to control, 
and responsibility for, the Hotel’s day-to-day management and operation and implementing and maintaining System 
Standards at the Hotel. In addition, our mandatory System Standards do not include any personnel or security-
related policies or procedures that we (at our option) make available to you in the Manual or otherwise for your 
optional use. You will determine to what extent, if any, these optional policies and procedures should apply to your 
Hotel’s operations. You acknowledge that we do not dictate or control labor or employment matters for franchisees 
and their employees and will not be responsible for the safety and security of Hotel employees or patrons.” 
http://www.techagreements.com/agreement-preview.aspx?num=664732  
4 There are a number of different expenses and fees associated with hotel franchise affiliation, and each varies 
substantially across brands (Blair and Lafontaine 2005). Typically, a franchisee must pay an initial fee with the 
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well as centralized reservation and referral systems. Franchise contracts with parent companies 
are generally for a pre-specified period of time (often 20 years).  
In contrast, under a management contract, a hotel company contracts with a developer or real 
estate owner to manage a given property (again, typically for 20 years). The company then 
brands the hotel property in question and provides management services. The owners in this 
case, which are often investor groups, cede responsibility for handling operations at the hotel to 
the parent company (i.e., the operator), which in turn makes all personnel, pricing, and other 
decisions (Kehoe 1996). As Eyster and deRoos (2009) describe, in a typical management 
contract, the operator is responsible for selecting, assigning, supervising, training, terminating, 
and determining compensation for employees. Contracts also generally stipulate that the owner 
cannot interfere with the operator’s management of the property, including personnel decisions.  
Neither hotels under management contracts nor franchised hotels are owned by the parent 
company itself. Company owned and operated hotels exist in many markets, but they account for 
less than 10% of total properties that carry a major brand name. In these hotels, as in properties 
under management contract, off-site parent companies make personnel decisions, including 
choices about compensation policy.  
Individual hotel brands vary in the degree to which their properties are franchised, are under 
management contract, or are company owned and operated. While several brands are entirely 
franchised (such as Ramada, Clarion, Microtel, Travelodge, and Howard Johnson), others are 
                                                                                                                                                             
franchise application, plus continuing fees that cover royalties, advertising expenses, reservation fees, frequent 
traveler programs, and other miscellaneous operations and programs. For example, a franchisee of a Motel 6 in 2008 
paid an initial $25,000 fee and had to have a hotel with at least 63 rooms. He or she then pays 4% of gross rooms 
revenue as a royalty fee as well as 3.5% of gross room revenue as an advertising/marketing fee annually to the 
parent company, Accor. To open a Hilton, an initial fee of $85,000 applies, 120 rooms are required, and the 
franchisee pays 5% of gross room revenue for royalties and 4% of gross rooms revenue for advertising/marketing. 
Fees and requirements vary even across brands under the same parent company; TownePlace Suites and Marriott 
Hotels and Resorts, both under the Marriott International corporate umbrella, have initial fees of $40,000 and 
$82,500, respectively, and different royalty and advertising fees, as well (Lodging Hospitality 2008).  
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entirely company managed (such as Extended Stay America, Fairmont, and Four Seasons). Many 
familiar brands are split; for example, over 80% of Marriott hotel properties are under 
management contract, while the remaining properties are franchised. Meanwhile, Courtyard by 
Marriott hotels, which operate under the same parent company (Marriott International), are 60% 
franchised and 40% company managed. The vast majority (over 95%) of Holiday Inns, Hampton 
Inns, and Holiday Inn Expresses are franchised, though in each case there are some properties 
under management contract or company owned (Lodging Hospitality 2009).5 
Franchising allows a chain to expand more quickly, but can dilute the brand if there is 
inadequate quality control.6 As Rushmore and Baum (2001) discuss, it is very costly for a parent 
company to monitor individual hotels under franchise agreements. The principal-agent problem 
that arises between franchisors and franchisees has been explored in past research on the hotel 
industry (Michael 2000; Kosová, Lafontaine, and Perrigot 2010) and in many other contexts 
(Caves and Murphy 1976, Rubin 1978, Mathewson and Winter 1985, Holmstrom and Milgrom 
1991, Sappington 1991). In this study, we focus not on agency problems that arise in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship, but rather on agency problems that arise due to the more 
limited supervision of employees in company managed hotels (i.e., those under management 
contract and those that are company owned and operated) relative to franchised hotels. As we 
describe below, differences in monitoring intensity across franchised and company managed 
hotels stem from the relatively strong incentives franchisees have to supervise workers closely.  
 
B.   Human Resources in the Hotel Industry 
                                                 
5 Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that franchisors typically maintain a stable ratio of franchised to non-
franchised units over time, though the target ratio varies substantially across firms. 
6 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a discussion on franchising and for a review of the empirical literature on 
the subject. 
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Jobs in the hospitality sector in general, and in hotels in particular, are predominately low-skilled 
and low-paying. According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), average earnings 
for non-supervisory workers in hotels and other accommodations were $402 per week in 2008, 
compared to $608 per week for workers in the private sector as a whole.7 Consistent with data 
we use in this study, the BLS also reports that the average hourly wage for maids and 
housekeeping cleaners, who account for roughly one-third of all hotel employees, was $9.74 in 
the traveler accommodation industry in 2009, 28 cents less than the average hourly wage for 
maids and housekeeping cleaners across all industries and less than half of the average hourly 
wage for all private-sector employees in the U.S.8  
Given that hotels are open around the clock and employees’ work schedules are highly 
variable, close supervision of workers in the lodging industry is challenging. Additionally, unlike 
in the fast food industry, where each outlet is relatively small and many tasks are automated, 
hotels are typically large and jobs are less routinized. As a result, even workers at the lowest 
rungs of the employment hierarchy within hotels, such as housekeepers, have ample opportunity 
to shirk and otherwise behave opportunistically (Wood 1992). As a former hotel housekeeper 
notes, 
I cut corners everywhere I could. Instead of vacuuming, I found that just picking up the 
larger crumbs from the carpet would do. Rather than scrub the tub with hot water, 
sometimes it was just a spray-and-wipe kind of day… After several weeks on the job, I 
discovered that the staff leader who inspected the rooms couldn't tell the difference 
between a clean sink and one that was simply dry, so I would often just run a rag over the 
wet spots… I apologize to you now if you ever stayed in one of my rooms. You deserved 
better. But if housekeepers were paid more than minimum wage — and the tips were a bit 
better — I might have cleaned your toilet rather than just flushed it. (Rupp 2009, 31) 
 
In addition to “cutting corners,” theft by employees is common in the lodging industry. A recent 
survey of hotels in Grand Strand/Myrtle Beach region of South Carolina revealed that the 
                                                 
7 http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs036.htm  
8 http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes372012.htm  
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average hotel experienced between four and five thefts perpetrated by employees in the previous 
two years, with losses ranging from $40 to tens of thousands of dollars (Krippel 2008). Another 
study examined police records on crimes reported by 64 Miami Beach hotels in 2002 and 2003 
and also found evidence of widespread employee theft (Brown, Ho, and Zhao 2009). Of the 756 
crimes against guests at the Miami hotels, about half were thefts, and 38% occurred in hotel 
rooms. Also revealing was the fact that more crimes against guests at hotels occurred in the 
afternoon than any other time of day. The authors contend that most of these crimes are 
committed by hotel employees and suggest that imposing high costs to being caught stealing as 
well as close supervision are crucial to theft prevention. 
Since they are residual claimants to profits generated by their properties, franchisees have a 
stronger incentive to monitor individual employees closely than managers of company managed 
hotels. Moreover, franchisees are often native to the areas in which their hotels are located, and 
to the extent that they are familiar with the local labor market, culture, demographics, and overall 
business environment, they may have less need to offer higher wages to attract and retain good 
workers. On the other hand, salaried managers in company managed properties, whose pay is not 
tied directly to the performance of their property and who are commonly transferred from hotels 
in other markets (Kennedy and Fulford 1999), may be less willing to supervise employees 
closely and less able to recruit good workers without offering higher wages. Krueger (1991) 
presents evidence that employees are supervised more closely in franchised fast food restaurants 
than in company owned fast food restaurants, which he attributes to the different incentives 
franchisees and salaried managers face. As summarized by Stephen P. Holmes, CEO of 
Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, the incentive structure is very similar in the hotel industry, 
where for franchisees, “entrepreneurial spirit drives the desire [to work hard] because your net 
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worth is tied up in the hotel. That tends to get your attention and pushes you” (Warren 2006, 23). 
A franchisee of a limited-service Microtel in Northern Virginia also noted that a franchisee must 
“understand how to make the business profitable. You work very long hours. When you open a 
hotel, you never lock the door again…” (Smith 2001).9  
Hotels in which supervision is more lax may be obliged to adopt personnel policies aimed at 
discouraging opportunistic behavior. Indeed, the above quote from Rupp (2009) suggests that 
there may be a trade-off between higher pay and benefits on the one hand and closer monitoring 
on the other. While labor costs represent about one-third of revenues at the typical hotel, there is 
substantial variation around the mean (Walker and Miller 2010). As Enz and Siguaw (2000) 
further discuss, there are significant differences across hotel chains in their strategies for 
attracting, retaining, training, and promoting workers. There is little direct evidence on 
differences in supervision or management practices across hotels with different organizational 
forms. However, the evidence available for the lodging industry points to variation in personnel 
practices among franchised and company managed properties within chains consistent with that 
found in the fast food industry, where studies suggest franchises implement different, and 
typically more low-road, human resource practices than do their company managed counterparts 
(Krueger 1991, Bradach 1998). As Umbriet (2003) describes, relative to franchises, chain 
corporate hotels more frequently use management-by-objectives (MBO) techniques, which 
emphasize individual objective setting and offer more autonomy to individual employees. This is 
consistent with company managed hotels having a limited ability to supervise workers closely. 
                                                 
9 All else being equal, differences in effort levels among franchisees and salaried managers at company managed 
hotels might be expected to improve profitability (Shelton 1967) or other performance outcomes for franchises 
relative to company managed hotels. However, in general, omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems 
associated with the choice of organizational form make it difficult to infer causality from any observed relationship 
between franchise status and performance. Studies that have attempted to account for the endogeneity of 
organizational form among hotels (e.g., Kosová, Lafontaine, and Perrigot 2010) have focused on revenues and 
prices, not costs or overall profitability. 
11 
 
Also, in a survey by Yang (2004) of employees at two upscale hotels, one of which was under 
management contract and one of which was franchised, workers at the former tended to be much 
more autonomous and engaged in decision-making, whereas workers at the latter appeared to be 
more passive and deferential to superiors.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that differences in organizational form, and in turn, the 
relationship between employers and employees, are associated with differences in compensation. 
One anonymous employee of Starwood Hotels and Resorts pointed out in an online forum that 
“franchise properties are not good to work for because they don’t have the same structure or 
benefits as the corporate hotels.”10 Similarly, an anonymous desk clerk at a Choice Hotel in 
Oxford, Alabama noted that “the lack of benefits or pay” was one negative aspect of working at a 
franchised hotel, and contended that “the francise [sic] owners should have to abide by some 
type of corporate standard for pay and benefits.”11 
 
III.  Agency and Compensation 
A large and growing body of research in personnel economics focuses on the methods firms use 
to address problems of asymmetric information between employers and their employees 
regarding underlying ability levels, intentions to remain in or leave jobs, and effort levels. If 
supervising workers is costly or difficult, then in order to mitigate principal-agent problems, 
employers may adopt a delayed compensation (or bonding) scheme, efficiency wages, or both. 
Formal theoretical models of each have been developed elsewhere (Lazear 1979, 1981; Lazear 
                                                 
10 http://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/Starwood-Hotels-and-Resorts-Reviews-E335.htm  
11 http://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/Choice-Hotels-Reviews-E6757.htm  
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and Moore 1984; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Yellen 1984), so in this section we provide only the 
basic intuition.12 
In a bonding model, firms elicit effort from employees by forcing them to post a bond upon 
beginning work, a bond they forfeit if they are fired for shirking. Though firms in the hotel 
industry (and most other industries) do not explicitly require workers to post such bonds, the 
model provides insight into nature of the agency problem and potential solutions. Suppose that 
the cost of exerting effort for a worker is e > 0, so in essence a worker places some positive value 
to shirking on the job. In the absence of any bonds and assuming a competitive labor market in 
which individuals accumulate only general skills, the worker will shirk since there is effectively 
no penalty to doing so. A worker fired for slacking off, stealing, or otherwise behaving 
opportunistically can immediately find employment elsewhere.  
However, if an employer requires a new employee to post a bond in the amount B that must 
be repaid if that employee is caught shirking, such opportunistic behavior can be discouraged. 
Specifically, if a worker who shirks is caught with probability p, then he or she stands to lose pB 
in expectation. Assuming the worker is risk neutral, he or she will not shirk as long as the 
expected cost from doing so is greater than the gain, or as long as e ≤ pB. For a given e, a lower 
probability of detection requires a larger bond to discourage shirking (Moretti and Perloff 2002). 
Though we rarely observe workers post upfront bonds, they may implicitly do so by 
accepting a compensation scheme in which payment is backloaded.13 In a deferred compensation 
scheme, firms tilt the wage tenure profile such that wages are higher later in a workers’ tenure 
                                                 
12 For a broader review of the theoretical and empirical literature on incentives within firms, see Prendergast 
(1999). 
13 Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) suggest that employees effectively post large bonds in law firms by accepting low 
wages early in their careers. They also find large, persistent firm size-wage effects in law firms, a result that runs 
counter to the idea that efficiency wages are being used as an incentive device. However, their results are not 
inconsistent with the idea that large firms pay higher wages to attract a better pool of workers.  
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than earlier. To illustrate how this may help to incentivize workers, we consider a simplified 
version of Lazear (1979) that draws on Ritter and Taylor (1997). 
Assume that workers can choose either to work hard, in which case they incur a cost e > 0, or 
to shirk, in which case they incur no cost. Suppose that a worker is indifferent between exerting 
effort e on a given job and earning WH, shirking on the job and earning WL, and not having the 
job. In that case, the difference between WH and WL, the reservation wages associated with high 
effort and no effort, respectively, is equal to e, the value the worker attaches to shirking (or the 
monetary value of exerting effort). If an employee works hard, his or her marginal revenue 
product, MRPH, is higher than if he or she shirks on the job, MRPL. If productivity is only a 
function of effort, it will be optimal for firms that value high productivity relatively highly 
(MRPH – MRPL ≥ e) to pay WH, and for firms that value high productivity relatively less to pay 
WL.  
However, if there is imperfect monitoring, simply paying WH will not guarantee high effort 
given that workers have outside options to which they are indifferent. As Lazear (1979) points 
out, though, tilting the earnings profile such that wages start below and rise above (the constant) 
WH will mitigate the shirking problem. If workers care only about the present value of their 
lifetime stream of earnings and have full access to credit markets, they will be indifferent to 
wage-tenure profiles with different slopes as long as their present values are the same (and are at 
least as much as the present value of their lifetime production).14 Therefore, a necessary 
                                                 
14 To the extent that a deferred compensation scheme discourages shirking and thereby raises a firm’s overall 
productivity, those firms that adopt such a scheme will also be able to pay more over a worker’s lifetime. However, 
a steeper wage-tenure profile poses risks to a worker; in particular, if a firm shuts down or dismisses a worker for 
reasons other than shirking, a worker will be harmed more if he or she is paid according to a deferred compensation 
scheme as opposed to a scheme in which wages track his or her MRP. To prevent opportunistic firing by a firm, 
there must also be some provisions that preclude firms from reneging on their implicit contracts with workers once 
wages rise above their MRP. However, there also must be ways to prevent workers from lingering beyond the time 
at which the present value of earnings and productivity are equalized (Lazear 1979, 1981). 
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condition for any underpayment-followed-by-overpayment scheme to work is that the present 
value of per-period wages and the present value of the constant wage WH are equalized, or 
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where Wt is the wage paid at time t and T is the date of retirement. The LQ curve in Figure 1 
illustrates a possible lifetime wage profile that satisfies this condition. Except for during the last 
period, there is no incentive for a worker to shirk with a wage profile like LQ. This can be 
verified by noting that at any time s during a worker’s life, given a probability that a shirking 
worker will be caught is p,  he or she will be discouraged from shirking as long as  
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Thus, at least until the last period, a firm can induce effort by tilting the wage-tenure profile, and 
ultimately pay no more or less than if it were to pay a constant wage that tracked a worker’s 
MRP exactly.15 We can couch the previous bonding example in this theoretical framework; 
referring back to Figure 1, an employee could post a bond equal to L – M = B, then receive a 
constant wage D (where K – M is the interest on the bond) until retirement, when the firm repays 
the principal (equal to Q – H) (Lazear 1979). 
                                                 
15 At time T, a worker has an incentive to shirk since there is no penalty so close to retirement. However, as 
Lazear (1979) notes, a firm could tailor a worker’s pension, which is received after retirement, to discourage 
shirking in the final period. 
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Hence, under a deferred compensation scheme, workers are effectively lending money to the 
firm early in their careers that will be paid back in the future. In that sense, workers with deferred 
compensation are bond holders; by accepting pay that is below what they are worth early in their 
careers, they implicitly buy bonds from their employer, which in turn pays back the principal and 
interest, but only to those employees not fired for shirking. Thus, a wage structure in which 
wages are low compared to workers’ best outside options early in their careers, but rise above 
them later, will help to discourage shirking by workers who know that such behavior could result 
in their premature dismissal and thus jeopardize their chances of winning higher wages.  
Firms may prefer a steeper profile to a flatter one not only because of its incentive effects, 
but also because of its potential sorting effects. Delayed compensation schemes will attract only 
employees who are committed to long-term relationships with employers. This, in turn, renders 
training investments less risky for firms.  
In lodging as well as many other low-wage industries, some firms adopt probationary wages 
for new employees, which serve to tilt the wage-tenure profile. However, in general, a 
compensation scheme that involves underpayment followed by overpayment can be difficult to 
implement by firms in low-wage industries. Such firms might be limited in their ability to reduce 
wages relative to workers’ outside options early in employees’ careers for a number of reasons. 
For example, minimum wages may preclude firms from paying low initial wages.16 In that case, 
a delayed compensation scheme, which is a first-best solution in the sense that ex-ante 
employment decisions are not affected by it relative to the full-information case, may not be 
                                                 
16 Other reasons offered in the literature for the rarity of bonding include the fact that American and English courts 
are reluctant to enforce contract provisions interpreted as penalties, and although firing is generally not viewed as a 
penalty, the forfeiture of a performance bond is (Dickens et al. 1989). Also, the outlawing of mandatory retirement 
has arguably interfered with the use of bonding and delayed compensation as incentive mechanisms (Lazear 1979). 
Additionally, moral hazard for the firm could pose a challenge to implementing a bonding or delayed compensation 
scheme; since firms have an incentive ex-post to misrepresent a worker’s performance, workers may be reluctant to 
ever enter contracts that involve bonding or delayed compensation (Ritter and Taylor 1997). 
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feasible. Instead, firms may adopt efficiency wages to address the principal-agent problem. 
Efficiency wages are above-market levels of pay that may help to improve productivity and 
reduce shirking. They may do so by helping to generate a larger and more qualified pool of 
applicants (and thereby allowing owners to be more selective in their hiring), by increasing the 
gap between workers’ current wage and their outside opportunities (and thus increasing the cost 
of being fired), and by fostering feelings of equity or fairness among employees in the firm 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1986).  
Returning to our example, if we assume that firms cannot offer workers any wage lower than 
their best outside options, then Wt must be greater than or equal to WH at all points in time. 
Therefore, to elicit effort, a firm would have to offer a stream of earnings greater in present value 
than that offered under the deferred compensation scheme. In other words, when bonding cannot 
be used to solve the agency problem, firms must offer an efficiency wage. One example of a 
profile in which the potential to use bonding is limited and efficiency wages are used is MN in 
Figure 1.  
Even if there is some potential to use deferred compensation as an incentive device, to the 
extent that it cannot fully resolve the agency problem, a firm will need to pay a premium to 
induce effort. The optimal stream of efficiency wages equalizes the left-hand and right-hand 
sides of equation (2), subject to any constraints on the wage that can be set in any given time 
period. In effect, the firm must adjust compensation such that, at any given point in time, the 
present value of wages yet to be received equals e/p (Ritter and Taylor 1997).17  
                                                 
17 Since firms that pay efficiency wages are paying a premium, they demand fewer workers and produce less than 
firms that do not need to pay efficiency wages. Therefore, all else being equal, a firm that faces agency problems 
will be at a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, in order to survive in the market, firms that pay efficiency wages 
must have equilibrium MRPs higher than the equilibrium MRPs of firms that do not. 
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Note that this implies that firms can use efficiency wages and deferred compensation 
together; if firms can tilt the wage-tenure profile, it will reduce the need for efficiency wages to 
encourage employees to work hard. This also makes clear that if monitoring costs are high (p is 
low), as is likely the case in the hotel industry more so than in many other low-wage industries, 
the wage profile will need to be steeper or, to the extent that tilting the profile is not possible, the 
efficiency wage premium will have to be greater.18  
A number of empirical studies have sought to determine the extent to which firms use 
deferred compensation or efficiency wages to address agency problems. Hutchens (1987) shows 
that jobs that involve more repetitive tasks, and thus are arguably easier to monitor, tend to have 
flatter wage-tenure profiles. Raff and Summers (1987) suggest that Henry Ford’s $5 per day 
wage in the 1910s was an efficiency wage, and that in line with the theory, it induced worker 
sorting, elicited effect, and reduced turnover. Krueger and Summers (1988), meanwhile, argue 
that the fact that observationally equivalent workers are paid different amounts in different 
industries suggests that efficiency wages are important. However, Leonard (1987) finds that 
higher levels of supervision in plants are not associated with lower wages. 
Krueger (1991) uses two cross-sectional datasets of employees of fast food restaurants to 
examine the use of deferred compensation and efficiency wages in the industry. His data allow 
him to control for many worker and restaurant characteristics in estimating differences between 
company owned and franchised outlets in the timing and level of pay. Krueger finds that relative 
to franchised outlets, company owned properties pay roughly the same initial wages, but offer 
                                                 
18 While pay and supervision are substitutes when the choice over effort levels is dichotomous (all or nothing) and 
the source of variation across firms is in monitoring costs, they may be complements when effort is a continuous 
outcome or when the source of variation across firms is in the return to effort  (Prendergast 1999, Allgulin and 
Ellingsen 2002).  In our application, we consider nonsupervisory and mainly entry-level positions among hotels with 
the same brand-determined quality standards. As such, desired effort levels are unlikely to vary substantially with 
monitoring costs, and variation across firms in the return to effort is likely small relative to variation in the costs of 
supervision,  
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steeper wage-tenure profiles, particularly for mid-level employees for whom output is hardest to 
measure and individual effort levels difficult to assess. Additionally, compared to franchised 
establishments, company owned stores typically provide more perks to employees, including free 
meals, paid vacation days, and other benefits. These patterns are consistent with company owned 
restaurants responding to more limited monitoring by adopting a combination of efficiency 
wages and deferred compensation. Each method of compensation could help to discourage 
opportunistic behavior as well as attract higher quality applicants who, once hired, may have a 
lower likelihood of leaving the firm or shirking on the job. Similarly, to the extent that 
supervision levels are lower in hotels that are company managed as opposed to franchised, they 
may adopt pay arrangements for employees aimed at addressing the more pronounced principal-
agent problem. 
 
IV.  Data 
A.  Data Sources 
To study how organizational form and variation in monitoring intensity affect the compensation 
and human resource practices within establishments, we take advantage of panel data on hotels 
obtained from the Smith Travel Research (STR) Company and WageWatch, Inc.19 The STR data 
cover over 98% of existing U.S. hotel properties in any given year and provide for each 
establishment a unique hotel identifier, parent company and brand identifiers, number of rooms, 
opening date, information about amenities (e.g., if the hotel has a restaurant, convention or 
                                                 
19 STR is an independent research firm that collects information about hotel properties in the U.S. and 
internationally. Its census of hotels represents the most comprehensive data source on the hotel industry available. 
WageWatch is an independent company that collects data on compensation from thousands of businesses across 
several industries in the U.S. for use by human resources departments and executives in making hiring decisions and 
in determining pay and benefit levels for employees. Both companies provided us access to their databases under 
strict confidentiality agreements. 
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conference facilities, extended stay rooms, etc.), features of the location (e.g., if the hotel is near 
an airport, on an interstate, part of a resort, etc.), and county.20 Also, for nearly all branded 
hotels, STR collects monthly information on hotel revenues as well as rooms available and sold. 
We use these monthly data to construct revenue per available room (or RevPAR as it is termed in 
the industry), a commonly used measure of financial performance in the hotel sector that reflects 
both room rates and occupancy. For each hotel, we calculate an annual average of RevPAR and 
deflate it by the consumer price index for all urban consumers (CPI-U) to reflect inflation-
adjusted 2009 dollars.  
Information in the WageWatch data includes for each occupation in each hotel by year the 
number of employees, the advertised starting wage (or salary if pay is not hourly), the lowest 
actual wage (or salary) currently paid, the average actual wage (or median salary) currently paid, 
and the highest actual wage (or salary) currently paid. For the purposes of our analysis, we 
convert all annual salary information into hourly wages, and then deflate wages by the CPI-U to 
reflect inflation-adjusted 2009 dollars.  
In addition to the wage variables, the WageWatch data include information not only on 
whether employees in each occupation receive bonuses,21 but also on whether raises are awarded 
on the basis of merit or otherwise.22 Additionally, we have information on whether employees in 
each occupation within a hotel are unionized and whether employees are subject to a 
                                                 
20 Actual hotel, brand, and parent company names have been replaced with numeric identifiers in the data to 
maintain their confidentiality. 
21 The WageWatch data separate bonuses from wages. However, hotels in the survey report bonus amounts using 
a wide variety of metrics (e.g., in dollars; in percent of weekly, monthly, or annual pay; in numbers of days, weeks, 
or months worth of wages; etc.) for which we have no documentation. Additionally, the frequency of bonuses is not 
always reported. Hence, we only use information on whether a hotel ever pays a bonus each year. However, given 
the structure of the survey, we can be confident that bonuses are not reflected in reported wages.  
22 If raises are not awarded on the basis of merit, they could be flat/across-the-board raises (i.e., non-discretionary 
compensation that does not vary according to performance), step raises (i.e., standard progression pay rates that are 
established in a pay range), or tenure-based raises. 
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probationary adjustment, or an increase in pay awarded after a probationary period (typically 
lasting 60-90 days). 
Data from WageWatch cover the years 2003-2009. In our analysis, we focus on limited 
service hotels, which represent smaller properties that emphasize basic room accommodations 
and amenities and in which the general manager typically directs all activities and oversees 
employees across departments (Stutts and Wortman 2006).23 In such hotels, the hiring of 
supervisors is less likely to mediate the relationship between a manager’s level of effort and the 
pay of nonsupervisory employees. Limited service hotels are also less likely than their full 
service counterparts to offer employees other benefits, such health insurance, that might 
compensate for lower wages (Beauchamp and Mandelbaum 2009).24 To ensure that differences 
in occupational distributions across hotels do not affect the results, we focus on the 30 largest 
non-supervisory positions, which comprise about 90% of the total workforce.25  
After dropping observations with missing information on our key dependent and explanatory 
variables and excluding unbranded hotels, our final sample encompasses 2,686 unique limited-
service hotels distributed across 436 counties and representing 82 brands that operate under 18 
                                                 
23 See also the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2010-11 Edition. 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos015.htm. 
24 WageWatch does not collect reliable information on health insurance or other fringe benefits such as free meals, 
free or discounted hotel rooms, flexible work schedules, or vacation time. These are all margins on which company 
managed hotels might differ from franchised properties, but for which we do not have data. However, benefits are 
not particularly commonplace in the lodging industry; according to the BLS’s 2009 National Compensation Survey 
(NCS), only 41% of accommodation and food services establishments offer health care benefits 
(http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2009/). Consistent with the NCS, according to the 2008 American Community 
Survey, only 42% of maids and housekeeping cleaners working in the traveler accommodations industry report 
having employer or union-provided health insurance. These shares are likely even lower in the relatively small, 
limited service hotels we consider (Beauchamp and Mandelbaum 2009).  
25 The 30 occupations include accountants, administrative assistants/department secretaries, banquet 
servers/waiters/waitresses, banquet set-up/house persons, bartenders, bell persons, breakfast attendants, bus persons, 
cooks - breakfast, cooks/line cooks, door persons, drivers - van/shuttle, food servers/wait staff, front desk agents, 
group rooms coordinators, housekeepers – entry-level, housekeepers - advanced, laundry attendants, lobby/public 
areas attendants, maintenance technicians – entry-level, maintenance technician – semi-skilled, maintenance 
technician - skilled, night auditors, restaurant hosts/hostesses/greeters, room service servers, sales managers - entry 
level, sales managers - intermediate, security officers/guards, stewards/dishwashers, and switchboard operators. 
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parent companies. The panel is unbalanced, as the composition of hotels and occupations in 
those hotels changes over time. All together, we have 29,579 occupation-hotel-year 
observations.26  
While WageWatch collects a wealth of information on employment and compensation for 
each occupation in each hotel, it does not collect information on the characteristics of individual 
employees. A legitimate concern is that pay levels may vary within occupation across franchised 
and company managed hotels because they hire different types of workers (e.g., one hires more 
educated individuals to work as bellhops than the other) or because their employees have 
different average tenure levels.27 If this is the case, the pay differences we attribute to differences 
in monitoring costs might in fact be attributable to differences in underlying worker 
characteristics. While we cannot control for worker characteristics directly, the high level of 
occupational detail in our data mitigates this concern to a large extent. The data break out even 
highly disaggregated occupation categories, such as maintenance technicians, into even finer 
detail, including entry-level, semi-skilled, and experienced maintenance technicians. WageWatch 
as opposed to individual hotels categorize occupations, which helps to ensure that the profile of 
                                                 
26 All the information in the WageWatch data are provided voluntarily by hotels, which in return receive 
information on compensation practices of other hotels in the same area and segment. They generally use this 
information for the purposes of benchmarking compensation within markets. Our methodology and conclusions do 
not depend on the profile of hotels in our sample matching that of the entire hotel industry. However, given that we 
can identify those hotels that do and do not subscribe to WageWatch, we can compare the characteristics of our 
STR-WageWatch matched sample to the population of hotels to shed some light on the representativeness of our 
sample. In line with the broader population of limited-service branded hotels, hotels in the matched sample are 71% 
company managed and 29% franchised (see Table 1). Hotels in the matched sample skew somewhat younger and 
larger (in terms of number of rooms) and are more likely to be in urban areas than the typical hotel. Hotels in our 
matched sample are also more likely than average to have restaurants, convention and conference facilities, and all-
suites rooms. However, the geographic distribution of hotels in the matched sample is similar to that of the entire 
population of hotels, with almost equal shares in each region of the U.S. 
27 Franchisees may have an incentive to free ride on the brand reputation and apply a lower standard to the quality 
of services they offer to customers. If this is the case, they may hire lower quality workers. However, Brickley and 
Dark (1987) and Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach (1991) find little evidence to support the notion that free-riding is an 
important source of variation in quality across franchised and company managed establishments. In addition, we 
exploit hotel amenity, brand, price, and location information to help to control for any quality differences that may 
exist between franchised and company managed properties. 
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workers within each occupation is similar across hotels. Moreover, in contrast to previous studies 
that relied on cross-sectional data, our panel data allow us to control for unobserved occupation 
and location effects as well as a number of time-varying observable and time invariant 
unobservable hotel and local area characteristics. This, together with our focus on limited service 
hotels, not only helps to address any omitted variable bias or endogeneity stemming from self-
selection, but also helps to mitigate any bias that might arise due to a lack of direct information 
on employee characteristics. Finally, in one robustness check, we examine differences in 
compensation and human resource practices across company managed and franchised hotels in 
specific occupations in which we might expect relatively less heterogeneity in underlying worker 
characteristics. 
To control for time-varying market characteristics, we combine the STR-WageWatch 
matched data with annual information from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Census 
Bureau on county characteristics. For each county, these variables include total employment, the 
average weekly wage (both from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and measured 
in the second quarter of each year), the unemployment rate (from the Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics database), and the share of the population that is black (from the Census Bureau’s 
population estimates).28 
In our analysis, we group company owned and operated hotels together with hotels under 
management contract under the heading “company managed.” As Kehoe (1996) notes, company 
owned and operated hotels and hotels under management contracts require about the same 
                                                 
28 We also experimented with including other county demographic characteristics, including the share of the 
population in different age categories and the share of non-US citizens. Their inclusion did not change our results. 
Notably, we use employment instead of population as a control because hotels are attracted more to high-
employment commercial centers than to residential areas. However, using population instead of employment as a 
control did not affect the results.  
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amount of monitoring by the parent company. In any case, less than 1% of the hotels in our 
sample of limited service hotels are company owned and operated.  
 
B.  Descriptive Statistics 
Statistics comparing the characteristics of company managed and franchised limited service 
hotels in our sample and comparing the compensation policies of each type of hotel appear in 
Table 1. As Panel A shows, on average, franchised and company managed hotels are similar in 
size (about 127-128 rooms), though franchised hotels tend to be slightly younger (the average 
opening year for franchised hotels is 1995, compared to 1994 for company managed hotels). 
Unionization rates in our sample of hotels are generally low, but franchised hotels are somewhat 
more likely to have unionized workers than company managed hotels (3% vs. 1%). Franchised 
hotels are also more likely to have a restaurant on the premises (17% vs. 5%). In terms of their 
typical locations, franchises are more likely to be in urban cores of cities as well as along 
interstates and in rural areas, while company managed properties are more likely to be in 
suburbs. However, while franchised properties are somewhat more common in the Northeast and 
company managed properties are somewhat more common in the South, the geographic 
distribution of limited service hotels in our sample across the U.S. under each organizational 
form is otherwise similar. 
Among the subset of hotels for which we have data on performance, franchised hotels have 
higher average RevPAR, which may in part reflect the greater effort put into running hotels by 
franchisees relative to salaried managers. However, there are other differences between company 
managed and franchised hotels that could explain the variation in average performance, and 
organizational form itself is likely to be endogenous with respect to RevPAR (Kosová, 
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Lafontaine, and Perrigot 2010). We explore this issue and its potential implications for 
compensation in Section V.B.4.  
Despite the differences in performance, the occupational composition of franchised and 
company managed hotels in our sample is similar. Figure 2 shows the average representation of 
each of the top ten largest nonsupervisory occupations within company managed and franchised 
hotels. The workforce of the average company managed hotel and the average franchised hotel is 
comprised of roughly equal shares of housekeepers (32-34%), front desk agents (18-21%), food 
servers (9%), drivers (7-9%), and most other occupations. In other words, the occupational 
distribution in company managed hotels is very similar to that of franchised hotels, which 
suggests that staffing policies differ little between hotels under each organizational form.  
While franchised and company managed hotels are staffed similarly, their compensation 
strategies appear to be quite different, as Panel B of Table 1 shows. At $8.71 (in 2009 dollars), 
average advertised starting wages in franchises are $0.45 lower than in company managed hotels, 
a difference significant at the 1% level. Average wages for the highest paid incumbent are also a 
statistically significant $0.64 lower in franchises. These differences are striking, especially given 
that company managed hotels tend to have lower RevPAR on average. 
Meanwhile, though the difference is not statistically significant, the average ratio of the 
highest paid incumbent wage to the starting wage within occupations is greater in company 
managed hotels on average, suggestive of a steeper earnings-tenure profile. Further, company 
managed hotels in our sample are significantly more likely to use probationary wages, which 
also serve to steepen wage-tenure profiles. However, one is more likely to find starting wages 
equal to the minimum wage in franchises than in company managed hotels.29 The unconditional 
                                                 
29 We compiled data by state and year on minimum wages using information from the U.S. Department of Labor 
(http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm).  
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comparisons of means in Table 1 also suggest that while company managed hotels are more 
likely to give raises on the basis of merit rather than for other reasons, franchised hotels are more 
likely to offer bonuses. 
One possible explanation for differences in compensation at company managed hotels 
relative to franchised hotels is that salaried managers at the former do not minimize costs. 
Salaried managers may, for example, pay higher wages to reduce their own workload (e.g., by 
reducing complaints among staff), in which case the observed differences in pay may have little 
to do with differences in supervision. However, wages and other personnel policies in the hotel 
industry, like in the fast-food industry considered by Krueger (1991), are generally set at the 
regional level as opposed to the establishment level for company managed properties 
(International Labour Organization 2001). To the extent that wages and other personnel policies 
are not at the discretion of their salaried managers, a failure to minimize costs in company 
managed hotels could not explain the observed differences. Nevertheless, in an effort to validate 
our assumption that organizational form is in fact capturing variation in supervision levels as 
opposed to other differences between company managed and franchised hotels, in the analysis 
that follows, we examine differences in compensation and human resource practices across 
company managed and franchised hotels in specific occupations in which we would expect 
monitoring problems to be more or less pronounced.30  
                                                 
30 To the extent that there is potential for career advancement and that parent companies can evaluate individual 
manager performance, general managers at company managed hotels may still have incentives to supervise workers 
closely to ensure high quality and strong financial performance. Our discussions with industry experts and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that internal labor markets are generally better developed in larger hotel chains, but that even in 
such chains, opportunities for promotion to more desirable hotels in the chain or to regional or central offices are 
limited and generally require relocation. As a night auditor at a Marriott observed in an online forum, “It’s 
extremely hard to move up within one property. Promotions are few and far between, unless you’re willing to move 
to another property” (http://www.glassdoor.com/Reviews/Employee-Review-Marriott-RVW366874.htm). 
Nonetheless, if managers in company managed hotels are motivated by the prospect of advancement within the firm, 
it could reduce differences between company managed and franchised hotels in the degree of employee monitoring. 
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Another potential confounding factor is that some franchisees own more than one property. 
Multi-unit franchises are less common among the limited service hotels we consider than among 
full service hotels.31 Nonetheless, the fact that some franchisees operate more than one hotel 
could lead to bias in our results. That bias, however, will be toward finding no difference 
between company managed and franchised hotels in terms of their compensation policies; the 
more hotels a franchisee operates, the more the franchisee resembles a parent company in that 
monitoring workers at each individual property becomes more difficult.  
 
V.  Empirical Analysis 
A.  Specifications 
In order to estimate the relationship between compensation and organizational form, which 
proxies for differences in monitoring intensity, we estimate variations on the following 
regression: 
 
(3)          ijkmttmkimtjkmtijkmtjkmtijkmt unionβcompanyy   MΨZΩ**         
 
where y is the wage or human resource policy outcome of interest (discussed further below) in 
occupation i in hotel j of brand k in county m at time t. The independent variable of most interest, 
company, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if hotel j is company managed in a given 
year and zero if it is franchised. If an occupation within a hotel is unionized, union takes a value 
                                                                                                                                                             
In this case, however, we would expect to find no significant differences between compensation and human resource 
practices between hotels with different organizational forms. 
31 For example, only about 1% of franchisees of hotels brands in the InterContinental Hotels Group, whose 
limited-service brands include Candlewood Suites, Holiday Inn, and Holiday Inn Express hotels, own more than one 
unit. Only 10% of Motel 6 franchisees and 15% of Super 8 franchisees own more than one unit. About one-fifth of 
franchisees of Choice Hotels, which include limited-service chains Sleep Inn, Comfort Inn, Quality Inn, Clarion, 
Rodeway Inn, and Econolodge, own multiple units. For more details, see http://www.entrepreneur.com/franchises/. 
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of one, but otherwise is zero. Z is a vector of hotel characteristics, including hotel size (measured 
as the natural log of the number of rooms), hotel age (in years), six indicators for location type 
(urban, airport, interstate, resort area, suburban, and rural), five indicators for various hotel 
services or amenities (extended stay, restaurant, conference facilities, boutique, and all suites), 
and indicators for each of five possible market-specific price range quintiles into which a hotel 
falls.32 These hotel-level characteristics help to control for differences in the scale and quality of 
hotel operations, which might affect compensation practices and be correlated with 
organizational form. M is a vector of local market characteristics, including the natural log of 
county employment, the county unemployment rate, the share of the county population that is 
black, the natural log of county average weekly wage, and the number of other hotels in the 
county (the latter derived from the STR census database). These variables help to control not 
only for time varying economic and demographic characteristics of the local market, but also for 
changes over time in industry structure, and competition. Including the number of other hotels in 
the county also helps to control for changes in local tourism activity. Finally, δ is an occupation 
fixed effect, γ is a brand fixed effect, ψ is a county fixed effect, η is a year fixed effect, and ε is 
the idiosyncratic error term. The fixed effects help to control for unobserved heterogeneity at 
occupation, brand, location, and year levels that may affect compensation and be correlated with 
organizational form. All regressions are weighted by the number of workers in each occupation 
in each hotel, and standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at the hotel 
level.  
                                                 
32 The STR-defined price range indicators are market-specific and based on average daily room rates. In 
metropolitan markets, the five indicators are defined as the top 15% of the average daily room rate (luxury), second 
15% (upscale), middle 30% (mid-price), next 20% (economy), and bottom 20% (budget). In non-metropolitan or 
rural markets, the luxury and upscale price categories are collapsed into one category constituting the top 30% of the 
average daily room rate. 
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In this specification, the effects of differences in organizational form on outcomes are 
identified off variation across hotels within geographic regions, brands, and occupations as well 
as over time. Given the panel nature of our data, we can go one step further by replacing the 
county fixed effect with a hotel fixed effect.33 In doing so, we exploit variation in organizational 
form over time within hotels to determine whether being franchised or company managed, with 
their different implied levels of employee supervision, affects outcomes. This latter specification 
relies on the fact that some hotels switch from being franchised to company managed or vice 
versa over the sample period. While not particularly common (35 hotels change organizational 
form in our sample, two-thirds of which switch from franchised to company managed and one-
third of which switch from company managed to franchised), these changes among individual 
hotels allow us to identify the implications of differences in monitoring for wages and other 
outcomes, and at the same time allow us to control for unobserved time invariant hotel 
characteristics that might affect compensation strategies and be correlated with organizational 
form.  
One concern is that those hotels that experience changes in management could be prompted 
by particularly weak or strong performance, which in either case might be expected to affect 
compensation levels within an establishment.34 Therefore, in one robustness check, we include 
hotel RevPAR (lagged one year) in Z, which helps to address endogeneity to the extent that 
changes in performance may affect both wages and the likelihood of changing organizational 
form. Another concern is that parent companies may have a greater propensity to take over 
management at franchises with pay policies more similar to those of company managed 
                                                 
33 Note that the establishment effect subsumes any location effect. However, the brand effect can still be identified 
in regressions with establishment effects because some hotels switch brands during the sample period. 
34 Hotels that are performing poorly or that are failing to meet brand standards are often sold off as independent 
hotels, in which case they drop out of our sample. 
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properties, and similarly, may be more likely to relinquish a company managed property to a 
franchisee if its compensation policies are inconsistent with those of its other properties. 
However, as we discuss in the results, the bias arising in this case will be toward finding no 
differences between company managed vs. franchised hotels in their compensation and human 
resource practices.   
In our analysis, we first examine differences between company managed and franchised 
hotels in log advertised starting wages, which speaks directly to whether company managed 
hotels might offer lower initial wages (indicative of a tilted wage-tenure profile) or higher initial 
wages (indicative of efficiency wages) relative to franchised hotels. We also evaluate differences 
in log highest incumbent wages by occupation across franchised and non-franchised hotels (both 
deferred-compensation and efficiency wage theories would argue that they should be higher in 
company managed hotels). Since we do not have information on the tenure of individual 
workers, we cannot examine differences in the slope of earnings-tenure profiles directly. Instead, 
we take the log ratio of the highest incumbent wage and the starting wage in an occupation as a 
proxy for the slope of the wage-tenure profile. While imperfect, given our expansive set of 
controls (and in particular, our 30 detailed occupation dummies), we believe this difference 
largely captures variation in wages within occupations in each hotel attributable to pay raises.35  
In addition to wage levels and dispersion, we also consider differences across franchised and 
company managed hotels in their propensity to set starting wages equal to the legislated 
                                                 
35 If incumbent wages are, on average, higher in company managed properties, it could reflect the fact that 
workers at company managed hotels generally have higher tenure, are of higher quality, or are better matched with 
their respective employers. More dispersion in wages in company managed properties could also simply arise from 
greater variance in tenure levels among employees. While this is a somewhat different interpretation of the results, 
such variation in worker characteristics across hotels with different organizational forms could reflect different 
levels of screening and monitoring that are also consistent with more pronounced agency problems at company 
managed hotels. In particular, if franchised establishments hire lower quality employees and/or are more likely to 
catch and dismiss shirking workers than company managed establishments, it could show up as lower average 
incumbent wage rates and less wage dispersion within occupations. 
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minimum wage, use probationary wages, offer bonuses, and award raises on the basis of merit 
rather than on the basis of purely tenure or in step with all other employees at the same 
establishment.36 For each of these four binary outcomes, we use a linear probability model to 
estimate the effects of different organizational forms.37 Examining differences between company 
managed and franchised hotels in the likelihood of paying the minimum wage to new employees 
provides another perspective on how agency problems might affect levels of compensation, and 
as with advertised starting wages, one that circumvents the problem arising from unobserved 
tenure. Meanwhile, the use of probationary wages is one means by which establishments can tilt 
the wage-tenure profile. Hence, to the extent that company managed hotels utilize deferred 
compensation schemes to address their more pronounced monitoring problems, we would expect 
them to make greater use of probationary wages.  
The theory also provides some guidance with respect to which types of establishments would 
be more likely to use bonuses and merit-based raises. If worker supervision is low, giving 
bonuses to individual employees or awarding raises on the basis of merit alone could be difficult. 
Indeed, we might expect franchisees to pay lower salaries but award more bonuses or merit-
based raises given their greater propensity to monitor individual workers closely and thereby 
ascertain which employees are most deserving. As we only observe whether or not bonuses are 
used and not the precise amounts, we cannot test the proposition that franchised employers offer 
bonuses sufficiently large that they completely compensate for a lower level of base pay. 
However, we can determine whether or not there are significant differences across franchised 
                                                 
36 We are missing data for 8,118 observations on methods of awarding raises, so there are fewer observations in 
samples focusing on this outcome.  
37 Results from fixed effect logit models were qualitatively similar.  
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and company managed hotels in their use of bonuses and merit-based raises as part of their 
broader compensation policies.38 
 
B.  Results 
1.  Baseline Regressions 
We first present results from regressions in which we control for occupation, hotel, and county 
characteristics and include brand, occupation, county, and year fixed effects. These baseline 
results appear in Tables 2 and 3. With respect to pay, the results in Table 2 show that on average, 
advertised starting wages are higher at company managed establishments relative to franchised 
properties. As column (1) shows, starting wages are a statistically significant 3.4% higher for 
employees at company managed hotels relative to employees at comparable franchised hotels on 
average. Consistent with steeper wage-tenure profiles at company managed properties, the 
highest wages paid to incumbent employees within occupations are substantially greater in 
company managed hotels than in franchises; the results indicate that the highest paid incumbents 
in company managed hotels receive wages that are on average 5.9% higher than the wages they 
would receive in franchises. At the mean values in our sample, this implies that the highest paid 
incumbents at company managed hotels earn on average about 60 cents more per hour than at 
observationally equivalent franchised hotels.  
Also consistent with steeper wage-tenure profiles in company managed hotels, the gap 
between the highest wage paid and the starting wage in an occupation within a particular hotel 
chain is 2.5% greater on average at company managed properties. As previously mentioned, 
differences in the highest incumbent wage and in the gap between the highest incumbent wage 
and the starting wage within an occupation could in part reflect differences in average tenure 
                                                 
38 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions appear in Appendix Table 1. 
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among workers in different types of hotels. Though we cannot directly address this issue, given 
the nature of hotel industry and the fact that many jobs are seasonal, tenure is largely a function 
of occupation. As such, our detailed occupational controls help us to address this concern.  
In Table 3, we report the results from linear probability models for other establishment 
human resource practices, including whether starting wages are equal to the legislated minimum 
wage, whether the hotel uses probationary wages, whether the hotel offers bonuses to employees, 
and whether raises in the hotel are awarded on the basis of merit. Consistent with the previous 
results showing higher average starting wages among company managed hotels, the  results in 
column (1) of Table 3 point to a statistically significant 3% higher likelihood among franchises 
to pay new employees the minimum wage. However, relative to franchises, company managed 
hotels are 9.7% more likely to use probationary wages, which temporarily reduce pay below the 
starting wage and effectively increase the slope the wage-tenure profile. Meanwhile, franchises 
are 9.7% more likely to offer bonuses, a result consistent with the idea that franchisees, who are 
likely in a better position to evaluate individual effort, may compensate workers for the lower 
average wages they offer by providing more performance-based pay. Similarly, the estimates in 
the final column of Table 3 suggest that merit-based raises are slightly more common in 
franchises than in company managed properties; we might expect this result if worker effort 
levels are more easily assessed in franchises relative to company managed properties. 
 
2.  Occupation-Specific Regressions 
Employees in some occupations may be more difficult to monitor than employees in other 
occupations, in which case we might expect differences across occupations in the extent to which 
company managed hotels would need to adjust their compensation structures to address agency 
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problems. As previously discussed, housekeepers have ample opportunity to shirk. On the other 
hand, front desk clerks are typically easier to monitor. Not only are the tasks of front desk agents 
(which largely consist of checking guests in and out) more readily documented and standardized 
(Talwar 2009), but video and other surveillance technology is more common in hotel lobbies 
than in guest rooms. Further, unlike housekeepers, front desk agents are not physically dispersed 
and constantly moving throughout the hotel. 
When we consider these two subsets of occupations, we find evidence that the previous 
results are more likely to be driven by differences in supervision levels than other factors that 
may differ systematically across company managed and franchised hotels. As the regression 
results in Table 4 show, for housekeepers, for whom supervision is particularly difficult, the 
magnitude of the estimates tends to be much larger than for front desk agents, for whom 
supervision tends to be easier. Indeed, the first two columns of Panel A in Table 4 show that 
relative to franchises, starting wages and highest incumbent wages for housekeepers in company 
managed hotels are 3.4% and 8.2% higher, respectively. For front desk agents (in Panel B), the 
results suggest differences across company managed and franchised hotels of 2% for starting 
wages and 3.4% for highest incumbent wages. Similarly, as can be seen in the rightmost columns 
of Table 4, differences between company managed hotels and franchised hotels in the likelihood 
of paying new employees the minimum wage, offering bonuses, and awarding raises based on 
merit are more pronounced for housekeepers than for front desk agents.  
 
3.  Hotel Fixed Effect Regressions 
The previous results could be biased if there are unobserved hotel characteristics that affect the 
level and structure of pay within occupations and, at the same time, are correlated with 
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organizational form. Hence, exploiting our panel data, we replicate our previous regressions with 
hotel instead of county fixed effects. We continue to weight the regressions by the number of 
employees in each occupation and adjust standard errors for heteroscedasticity and hotel-level 
clusters. 
The results, which appear in Table 5, are not appreciably different than those of the baseline 
regressions in Tables 2 and 3. As column (1) of Table 5 shows, controlling for all observable and 
unobservable time invariant characteristics of hotels as well as time-varying features of 
establishments and their local markets, advertised starting wages at company managed hotels are 
4.1% higher than at franchised hotels (a result significant at the 10% level). The highest 
incumbent wage at company managed hotels is a statistically significant 7% higher on average. 
Though the spread between the highest incumbent wage and the starting wage is not significantly 
different under different organizational forms, the results are still suggestive of a steeper wage-
tenure profile at company managed properties. Further evidence of this appears in column (5), 
which shows that even when controlling for hotel fixed effects, company managed hotels are 
15.4% more likely to use probationary wages. However, differences in the propensity of 
franchises and company managed properties to offer bonuses or award raises based on merit are 
not statistically different in these regressions. 
Overall, though they are less precise due to the relatively small number of hotels that change 
organizational form, the estimates from the hotel fixed effect regressions echo those from the 
baseline regressions. This suggests that the previous results, which indicated that agency 
problems may induce company managed hotels to adopt compensation policies that tilt the wage-
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tenure profile, were not substantially biased due to the omission of unobserved hotel 
characteristics.39   
 
4.  Compensation and Endogenous Changes in Organizational Form  
As previously discussed, changes in organizational form are not likely to be entirely random. 
Though changes may be exogenous to compensation and human resource practices in some 
instances, such as when they take place after a franchise or management contract lapses, we 
cannot identify the circumstances under which each change in organizational form occurs. It is 
plausible that particularly strong or weak performance could precipitate changes in 
organizational form as well as changes in compensation. For example, parent companies may be 
more likely to take over management of relatively successful franchises, whose wages might be 
growing more quickly than those of the typical franchise. Similarly, parent companies may be 
more likely to cede control of a poor performing company managed property to a franchisee, in 
which case compensation may be growing slower at company managed hotels that switch 
organizational form relative to those that do not.  
To address the possibility that our current set of covariates may not sufficiently capture 
changes in performance that might trigger changes in organizational form, we include hotel 
RevPAR as an additional control as a robustness check. We lag RevPAR one year given that it is 
performance in the recent past rather than contemporaneous performance that will most likely 
affect compensation for nonsupervisory workers. At the same time, treating RevPAR as a pre-
                                                 
39 Results from the hotel fixed effects regressions for housekeepers and front desk agents also support our 
previous conclusion that differences in compensation are likely driven by differences in supervision across hotels 
with different organizational forms. For housekeepers, the occupation with more pronounced monitoring problems, 
estimated coefficients on company managed are positive and significant at the 5% level for highest incumbent 
wages and the use of probationary wages. However, for the more easily monitored front desk agents, in none of the 
seven regressions was the estimated coefficient on company managed significant. 
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determined variable helps to circumvent any reverse causality that might be present between 
wages and hotel performance. The results appear in Table 6, where for brevity, we have only 
included the estimated coefficients on the company managed dummy and on lagged RevPAR.40 
Due to missing data on revenues, we lose 100 hotels (963 observations) when we control for 
lagged performance. Thus, for comparison purposes, we include results with and without the 
RevPAR control. Panel A of Table 6 shows results with county fixed effects, while Panel B 
shows results with hotel fixed effects. In regressions without hotel fixed effects, wages and the 
probability of offering bonuses are positively, albeit weakly, related to RevPAR. Interestingly, 
when we identify the relationships off changes over time within hotels, there is a much stronger 
positive association between performance and bonuses, but a negative relationship between 
performance and wages emerges. The latter result may suggest that hotels respond to better 
performance not by increasing wages for current employees, but rather by hiring new employees 
who are paid less than average (e.g., part-time workers).  
More importantly, however, controlling for hotel performance has very little impact on the 
magnitudes and significance of the estimated coefficients on the company managed dummy. 
This is true both in the regressions that exploit inter-hotel variation as well as those that take 
advantage of intra-hotel changes in organizational form. This suggests that to the extent that 
there is unobserved variation in performance that might be correlated with both changes in 
organizational form and with compensation, our existing controls largely capture that variation.  
However, changes in organizational form may still be endogenous if, for instance, parent 
companies are more willing to take over management of franchises whose compensation and 
                                                 
40 The coefficients on the company managed dummy are little changed when we use current as opposed to lagged 
RevPAR. This is not surprising since, as Stock (2010) notes, even if a control variable (in this case, 
contemporaneous RevPAR) is correlated with the error term, under the conditional mean independence property, the 
coefficient on the variable of interest (the company managed dummy) will be unbiased and consistent and can be 
interpreted as a causal effect. 
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human resource practices grow more similar to their own over time. Similarly, a company 
managed property may be more likely to be sold to a franchisee if its personnel policies become 
inconsistent with those of other company managed properties. In this case, franchises that 
become company managed are likely to have personnel policies and compensation structures 
more similar to company managed properties than the typical franchise (and vice versa for 
company managed properties that become franchises). If this were true, however, it would tend 
to bias us toward finding no differences in compensation or human resource practices between 
company managed and franchised hotels. The fact that we continue to find substantive 
differences across hotels with different organizational forms suggests that variation in 
monitoring intensity has meaningful implications for wages and personnel policies. 
Overall, our results point to the use of deferred compensation as a means to elicit effort from 
employees and potentially attract more committed applicants. While advertised starting wages 
are similar at company managed and franchised hotels, the former are much more likely to use 
probationary wages, which effectively steepen the wage-tenure profile. The relatively high 
incumbent wages and the larger gap between the highest paid incumbent’s wage and the starting 
wage within detailed occupations at company managed hotels further suggests that workers at 
franchises experience less wage growth over time. However, franchise workers may be 
compensated for their lower base pay and weaker wage growth with more performance-based 
pay, including bonuses. As a result, we cannot conclusively determine whether company 
managed hotels pay workers more in present value than they would in the full-information case. 
However, the timing of pay and the extent to which it is tied to individual performance is clearly 
linked to organizational form, which captures differences in levels of supervision. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between employee supervision and compensation in 
the hotel industry, in which many chains have both company managed and franchised properties. 
Our analysis builds upon past research that exploits the particular structure of specific industries 
to draw inferences about how variation in supervision may affect pay and personnel practices 
(Krueger 1991, Rebitzer and Taylor 1995). However, relative to the industries considered in 
previous studies, the hotel industry arguably provides a stronger test of different theories of 
compensation in the context of imperfect monitoring. Hotels are not only labor-intensive, but 
they are often expansive, and technology is generally a poor substitute for close human 
supervision. Meanwhile, differences in incentive structures for salaried managers at company 
managed properties relative to franchisees naturally give rise to variation in monitoring intensity. 
These features of the lodging industry, coupled with our rich panel data on hotels, offer a unique 
opportunity to explore if and how information asymmetries in the workplace affect the structure 
of compensation and other human resource practices. 
Exploiting variation in organizational form both across and within hotels over time, we find 
evidence that differences in supervision levels affect the timing of pay. In particular, among 
company managed properties, where employee supervision is likely to be less rigorous compared 
to franchised properties, the structure of wages suggests the greater use of deferred compensation 
to induce effort and discourage shirking. While our results are not inconsistent with the use of 
efficiency wages in hotels with less employee supervision, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
the present value of career-long wages are equalized across franchised and company managed 
establishments. Nonetheless, our paper provides compelling evidence that variation in 
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monitoring intensity influences the timing of pay and employers’ propensity to use certain 
performance-based incentives, such as bonuses and merit-based raises.  
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TABLE 1 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
  Company Managed Franchised Difference 
Panel A: Hotel Characteristics 
Number of Rooms 127.824 127.024 0.800 
 (0.900) (1.753) (1.797) 
Opening Year 1993.837 1994.981 -1.144*** 
 (0.216) (0.335) (0.399) 
Share of Hotels    
  With Any Unionized 0.008 0.029 -0.021*** 
      Employees (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
  With Restaurant 0.054 0.169 -0.116*** 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.012) 
  In Urban Area 0.096 0.162 -0.066*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) 
  Near Airport  0.124 0.101 0.023* 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) 
  On Interstate 0.032 0.047 -0.015* 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
  In Resort Area 0.027 0.036 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
  In Suburban Area 0.686 0.560 0.126*** 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.020) 
  In Rural Area 0.036 0.095 -0.059*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) 
  In Northeast 0.106 0.144 -0.037*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) 
  In Midwest 0.184 0.214 -0.030* 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) 
  In West 0.219 0.232 -0.013 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) 
  In South 0.491 0.411 0.080*** 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.021) 
RevPAR ($2009)+ 49.566 73.102 -23.536*** 
     (0.568) (0.887) (1.050) 
Number of Hotels 1,900 786  
Panel B: Occupation Characteristics (Weighted by Number of Employees) 
Starting Wage ($2009) 9.153 8.707 0.446*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.045) 
Highest Incumbent Wage  11.021 10.382 0.639*** 
    ($2009) (0.031) (0.050) (0.059) 
Highest Incumbent Wage/ 1.218 1.209 0.009 
    Starting Wage (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) 
Share of Hotels That    
  Pay Starting Wage Equal  0.097 0.114 -0.017*** 
      to Minimum Wage (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
  Use Probationary Wages 0.183 0.157 0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
  Offer Bonuses 0.012 0.155 -0.144*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
  Give Merit-Based  0.821 0.687 0.133*** 
      Raises++ (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
Observations 19,020 10,559  
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show means for each characteristic with standard errors in parentheses. Differences in means with 
standard errors in parenthesis appear in column (3). Significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. +Due to missing data, there are 1,849 
company managed and 771 franchised hotels with information on revenues per available room (RevPAR). ++Due to missing 
data, there are 14,500 observations for company managed and 6,959 observations for franchised hotels with information on 
methods of awarding raises.  
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TABLE 2 
BASELINE REGRESSIONS - WAGES 
 
Log Starting 
Wage 
Log Highest 
Inc. Wage 
Log Highest-
Starting Diff. 
Company Managed 0.033*** 0.057*** 0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) 
Unionized 0.048* 0.110*** 0.062*** 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.020) 
Log Number of Rooms 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
Age (Years) -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Urban 0.024 0.051* 0.027 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.024) 
Airport -0.002 0.034 0.036 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) 
Interstate -0.011 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) 
Resort Area -0.002 0.022 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.026) 
Suburban 0.003 0.024 0.021 
 (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) 
Extended Stay -0.091** 0.045 0.136* 
 (0.044) (0.060) (0.070) 
Restaurant 0.005 -0.006 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
Convention Facilities -0.092*** -0.040 0.052 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) 
Boutique 0.169*** 0.189*** 0.020 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) 
All Suites -0.012 -0.053* -0.040 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) 
Log County Employment  -0.176 -0.081 0.095 
 (0.111) (0.099) (0.095) 
County Unemployment Rate -0.011*** -0.003 0.008*** 
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
County Share Black -0.412 -0.401 0.011 
 (0.717) (0.711) (0.632) 
Log County Average Weekly Wage 0.264** 0.429*** 0.165** 
     (0.117) (0.122) (0.082) 
No. of Other Hotels in County 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Constant 1.980 -0.634 -2.613* 
 (1.576) (1.540) (1.366) 
R-Squared 0.693 0.593 0.251 
Observations 29,579 29,579 29,579 
Brand Fixed Effects 82 82 82 
Occupation Fixed Effects  30 30 30 
County Fixed Effects  436 436 436 
Note: In addition to brand, occupation, and county fixed effects, all specifications include 5 price range 
and 7 year dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at the hotel level 
in parentheses. Significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
48 
 
TABLE 3 
BASELINE REGRESSIONS - HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICES 
 
Start. Wage = 
Min. Wage 
Probationary 
Wages Bonus 
Merit-Based 
Raises 
Company Managed -0.030*** 0.097*** -0.097*** -0.062* 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.034) 
Unionized -0.098*** 0.007 -0.006 0.033 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.071) 
Log Number of Rooms -0.008 -0.036 -0.014 -0.077** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.015) (0.037) 
Age (Years) -0.0002 -0.002** -0.0005 -0.001 
 (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban 0.022 0.039 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.045) (0.076) 
Airport 0.017 0.010 -0.032 0.006 
 (0.042) (0.056) (0.043) (0.071) 
Interstate 0.109** 0.036 -0.047 -0.008 
 (0.047) (0.053) (0.040) (0.064) 
Resort Area 0.038 -0.080 0.006 0.087 
 (0.044) (0.070) (0.051) (0.084) 
Suburban 0.016 -0.012 -0.027 0.019 
 (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.069) 
Extended Stay -0.056 0.347*** 0.059 -0.050 
 (0.041) (0.129) (0.082) (0.163) 
Restaurant 0.003 -0.017 0.018 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) (0.039) 
Convention Facilities 0.171*** 0.284* 0.011 0.075 
 (0.047) (0.153) (0.039) (0.142) 
Boutique -0.360*** 0.019 0.012 -0.509 
 (0.065) (0.103) (0.049) (0.311) 
All Suites 0.072 0.048 -0.045 0.029 
 (0.046) (0.065) (0.037) (0.082) 
Log County Employment  0.163 0.053 -0.002 -0.300 
 (0.109) (0.374) (0.161) (0.274) 
County Unemployment Rate -0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.011 
     (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) 
County Share Black 0.073 2.750 0.467 -1.387 
 (0.712) (2.579) (1.104) (2.793) 
Log County Average Weekly Wage 0.232* 0.102 -0.054 0.771** 
     (0.140) (0.336) (0.199) (0.342) 
No. of Other Hotels in County 0.003*** -0.001 0.001** 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001) 
Constant -3.165* -1.252 0.340 -0.0001 
 (1.851) (5.299) (2.558) (4.159) 
R-Squared 0.372 0.534 0.333 0.568 
Observations 29,579 29,579 29,579 21,459 
Brand Fixed Effects 82 82 82 78 
Occupation Fixed Effects  30 30 30 30 
County Fixed Effects  436 436 436 406 
Note: In addition to brand, occupation, and county fixed effects, all specifications include 5 price range and 7 year dummies. 
Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at the hotel level in parentheses. Significant at *10%; **5%; 
***1%. 
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TABLE 4 
BASELINE REGRESSIONS – SPECIFIC OCCUPATIONS 
 
Log Starting 
Wage 
Log Highest 
Inc. Wage 
Log Highest-
Starting Diff. 
Start. Wage = 
Min. Wage 
Probationary 
Wages Bonus 
Merit-Based 
Raises 
Panel A: Housekeepers 
Company Managed 0.033*** 0.079*** 0.046*** -0.034** 0.108*** -0.097*** -0.074* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.038) 
Unionized 0.051 0.086*** 0.035 -0.095** 0.023 0.060 -0.049 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.039) (0.054) (0.056) (0.117) 
Log Number of Rooms 0.032*** 0.033** 0.0003 -0.006 -0.038 -0.008 -0.081** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027) (0.016) (0.041) 
Age (Years) -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001** -0.002** 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 6,222 6,222 6,222 6,222 6,222 6,222 4,699 
Panel B: Front Desk Agents 
Company Managed 0.020*** 0.033*** 0.013 -0.008* 0.116*** -0.085*** -0.030 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.004) (0.020) (0.013) (0.038) 
Unionized 0.028 0.080* 0.052 -0.013 0.104 -0.049 0.165 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.041) (0.013) (0.077) (0.036) (0.154) 
Log Number of Rooms 0.044*** 0.022* -0.022** -0.001 -0.029 -0.005 -0.058 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.026) (0.018) (0.038) 
Age (Years) -0.001*** 0.001 0.001*** -0.0001 -0.003** -0.0002 -0.001 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 4,298 3,214 
Brand Fixed Effects 82 82 82 82 82 82 78 
County Fixed Effects  436 436 436 436 436 436 406 
Note: All specifications include the same location, amenity, and county characteristics included in the baseline regressions in Tables 2 and 3 along with 5 price range 
and 7 year dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at the hotel level in parentheses. Significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
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TABLE 5 
HOTEL FIXED EFFECT REGRESSIONS 
 
Log Starting 
Wage 
Log Highest 
Inc. Wage 
Log Highest-
Starting Diff. 
Start. Wage = 
Min. Wage 
Probationary 
Wages Bonus 
Merit-Based 
Raises 
Company Managed 0.040* 0.068** 0.028 -0.030 0.154* 0.017 -0.028 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032) (0.089) (0.029) (0.048) 
Unionized 0.078 0.095 0.017 -0.181*** -0.043 -0.024 -0.042 
 (0.049) (0.066) (0.027) (0.041) (0.053) (0.034) (0.055) 
Log Number of Rooms 0.007 -0.002 -0.009* 0.013 0.023*** 0.010*** 0.012 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.039) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010) 
Age (Years) 0.009 0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.055** -0.024 -0.021 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
Log County Employment  -0.291** -0.092 0.199* 0.347** 0.036 -0.136 -0.664 
 (0.125) (0.118) (0.102) (0.147) (0.421) (0.195) (0.471) 
County Unemployment Rate -0.009*** -0.004 0.005* -0.006 -0.006 0.012 0.002 
     (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
County Share Black -1.474* -1.121 0.353 0.153 1.375 0.886 4.623 
 (0.808) (0.892) (0.936) (1.001) (3.245) (1.132) (4.624) 
Log County Average Weekly  0.070 0.239** 0.169** 0.353** 0.254 -0.212 0.670* 
    Wage (0.097) (0.099) (0.082) (0.176) (0.365) (0.234) (0.352) 
No. of Other Hotels in  0.001 0.001** 0.0004 0.003*** -0.0002 0.001** 0.001 
    County (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 4.990*** 1.293 -3.697** -6.637*** -1.469 2.880 4.067 
 (1.658) (1.576) (1.506) (2.446) (6.238) (2.823) (5.636) 
R-Squared 0.755 0.687 0.415 0.495 0.741 0.580 0.853 
Observations 29,579 29,579 29,579 29,579 29,579 29,579 21,459 
Brand Fixed Effects 82 82 82 82 82 82 78 
Occupation Fixed Effects  30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Hotel Fixed Effects  2,686 2,686 2,686 2,686 2,686 2,686 2,243 
Note: In addition to brand, occupation, and hotel fixed effects, all specifications include 7 year dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at the 
hotel level in parentheses. Significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
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TABLE 6 
REGRESSIONS WITH PERFORMANCE CONTROLS 
 Log Starting Wage 
Log Highest 
Inc. Wage 
Log Highest-
Starting Diff. 
Start. Wage = 
Min. Wage 
Probationary 
Wages Bonus 
Merit-Based 
Raises 
Panel A: Baseline Regressions 
Without Performance Controls 
Company Managed 0.034*** 0.058*** 0.023*** -0.029*** 0.094*** -0.101*** -0.059* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.034) 
With Performance Controls 
Company Managed 0.034*** 0.058*** 0.023*** -0.029*** 0.095*** -0.101*** -0.059* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.034) 
Log RevPAR (Lagged) 0.014 0.026** 0.012 -0.018 0.120*** 0.031 -0.029 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.029) (0.023) (0.043) 
Panel B: Hotel Fixed Effect Regressions 
Without Performance Controls 
Company Managed 0.030 0.065** 0.034 -0.025 0.123 0.026 -0.036 
 (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) (0.034) (0.088) (0.031) (0.051) 
With Performance Controls 
Company Managed 0.030 0.064** 0.034 -0.026 0.127 0.028 -0.034 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.034) (0.087) (0.031) (0.051) 
Log RevPAR (Lagged) -0.005 -0.041** -0.036** -0.053* 0.301*** 0.118*** 0.045 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.032) (0.066) (0.039) (0.063) 
Observations 28,616 28,616 28,616 28,616 28,616 28,616 20,704 
Brand Fixed Effects 78 78 78 78 78 78 75 
Occupation Fixed Effects 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
County Fixed Effects  (Panel A) 427 427 427 427 427 427 401 
Hotel Fixed Effects  (Panel B) 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,586 2,158 
Note: All specifications include the same variables as in Tables 2 and 3 (Panel A) and Table 5 (Panel B). Robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clusters at 
the hotel level in parentheses. Significant at *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
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FIG. 1.–Alternative wage-tenure profiles.  
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FIG. 2.–Distribution of Employment - Top 10 Occupations in Limited Service Hotels 
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